Semantic categories in the world's languages often reflect a historical process of chaining: A name for one referent is extended to a conceptually related referent, and from there on to other referents, producing a chain of exemplars that all bear the same name. The beginning and end points of such a chain might in principle be rather dissimilar. There is also evidence supporting a contrasting picture: Languages tend to support efficient, informative communication, often through semantic categories in which all exemplars (...) are similar. Here, we explore this tension through computational analyses of existing cross-language naming and sorting data from the domain of household containers. We find formal evidence for historical semantic chaining, and evidence that systems of categories in this domain nonetheless support near-optimally efficient communication. Our results demonstrate that semantic chaining is compatible with efficient communication, and they suggest that chaining may be constrained by the functional need for efficient communication. (shrink)

Machery (2009) has proposed that the notion of ‘concept’ ought to be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology. I raise three questions about his argument: (1) Is there a meaningful distinction between concepts and background knowledge? (2) Do we need to discard the hybrid view? (3) Are there really categories of things in the world that are the basis for concepts? Although I argue that the answer to all three is ‘no’, I agree with Machery's conclusion that seeking a (...) single characterization of concepts will not be fruitful for understanding cognitive representations and processes. (shrink)

Questions about the nature of word meaning have drawn attention across the cognitive science disciplines. Because words are one of the basic units of language, linguists working to describe the design of human language have naturally been concerned with word meaning. Perhaps less obvious, though, is the importance of word meaning to other disciplines. Philosophers seeking to identify the nature of knowledge and its relation to the world, psychologists trying to understand the mental representations and processes that underlie language use, (...) and computer scientists wanting to develop machines that can talk to people in a natural language have all worked to describe what individual words mean, and, more generally, what kind of thing a word meaning is. (shrink)